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lease cite
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Fearnside, P.M. 2001. Environme=
ntalists
split over
ISSN: 0=
376-8929
Copyrig=
ht:
Cambridge University Press
The original pub= lication is available at http://journals.cambridge.org/ <publisher link>
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Environmentalists split over Kyoto =
and
Amazonian deforestation
Philip M. Fearnside
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; Department
of Ecology
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; National
Institute for Research
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; in the Amazon (INPA)
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sp; =
&nb=
sp;
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C.P.
478
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69011-970
Manaus, Amazonas
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&nb=
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nbsp; BRAZIL
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&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
Fax:
+55-92-642-8909
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
Tel:
+55-92-643-1822
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
e-mail
pmfearn@inpa.gov.br
=
&nb=
sp; =
22 May 2001
=
&nb=
sp; revised
=
&nb=
sp; revised
For the
“Commentary” section of Environmental Conservation (EC 5=
44)
Comment
Environmentalists split over Kyoto =
and
Amazonian deforestation
Controversies over tropical
forest and
Slowing deforestation in
Amazonia would be a significant contribution to combating global warming an=
d,
depending on decisions under the Kyoto Protocol, could provide non-destruct=
ive
support for rural population in the region (Fearnside, 2000a). Crediting avoided
deforestation is divisive, both within and among environmental non-governme=
ntal
organizations (NGOs) and governments. Positions of NGOs on inclusion of avo=
ided
deforestation in the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CD=
M)
are tightly linked to geography: European NGOs oppose inclusion of forests,=
USA
NGOs (other than USA branches or affiliates of international groups) favor
inclusion of forests, and Brazilian NGOs (also excepting most branches or
affiliates of international NGOs) also favor forests. The probability of chance explaini=
ng these views being clus=
tered
in Europe, North America and Brazil in this way is miniscule. In other words, these positions are
based on something other than the universal concerns about climate change a=
nd
future generations that predominate in public statements on all sides.
Much
opposition to avoided deforestation as a supposed “loophole” st=
ems
from the belief that it is a “dangerous distraction” because
“The way the Protocol has been written, every ton of carbon absorbed =
by a
sink allows a ton of carbon to be emitted from burning fossil fuels” =
(WWF Climate Change Campaign, 2000). Fortunately, this interpretation is
mistaken because one does not need to assume a ratio of one-to-one between =
the
carbon maintained in the forests and the credit granted that allows fossil-=
fuel
carbon to be emitted. More carbon can be maintained in the forests t=
han
the amount of carbon credit granted. In this way, even if the carbon in the
forests is temporary, at some point a net benefit exists for the climate fr=
om
having a forest maintenance project instead of a smaller reduction in
fossil-fuel emissions. If well negotiated, inclusion of forests can result =
in
concrete gains for global climate, in addition to large advantages in other
spheres.
Opponents
of including forests point to the fact that forests could later be cut,
degraded, or burned, thereby releasing their carbon to the atmosphere. Climatic change itself is used to =
attack
crediting forest conservation on the grounds that many forests in Amazonia =
are
doomed anyway due to predicted drying (e.g., Greenpeace International, 2000=
a;
see rebuttal by Niles, 2000).
Because the credits generated by a CDM project would allow carbon to=
be
emitted to the atmosphere by burning fossil fuels in an Annex I (developed)
country, more carbon would be present in the atmosphere when the forest lat=
er
disappears than in the no-project case (Meinshausen & Hare, 2000).
Fortunately,
several factors counteract this effect. Most important is the implication of
forest opponents that the same weight should be given to events in the pres=
ent as
to those in the distant future. Global warming alters the probabilities of
droughts, floods and other disasters, which can be assumed to remain higher
forever after temperature increases. Therefore, any postponement of global
warming represents a permanent earnings of all damages that would have occu=
rred
during the interval that warming was postponed. In other words, time has va=
lue
and maintaining carbon in forests has value even if uncertain and impermane=
nt
(Fearnside et al., 2000). Per=
ton
of carbon, this value is not 100% of the value of a ton of fossil-fuel
carbon--but neither is it zero. The
relevant question is how to quantify the conversion and make appropriate
adjustments to crediting (Fearnside, 2000b; Fearnside et al., 2000).
“Market-based” mechanisms such as the “Colombian
Proposal” also achieve this end (Blanco & Forner, 2000; Kerr &
Leining, 2000; see
also similar proposals by Dutschke, 2=
001
and Marland et al., 2001).
In July 2001 an agreement was reached in Bo=
nn,
Germany, at the second round of the Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6-=
bis)
of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UN-FCCC). The Bonn agreement excludes avoided
deforestation from the CDM in the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment
period (2008-2012). The quest=
ion of
avoided deforestation remains relevant to the Kyoto negotiations because of=
the
need to define the rules for the second and subsequent commitment periods a=
nd
because of the possibility of funding avoided-deforestation projects with m=
oney
generated by the as-yet undefined compliance system (Schlamadinger et al.,
2001). Much of the deba=
te
over carbon accounting and possible adjustments (Noble et al., 2000) is also
relevant to other forest-sector activities, such as reforestation, which ha=
ve
been included in the CDM under the Bonn agreement.
Government Positions
The USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand
have supported inclusion of forests.
Particularly the USA, Canada and Japan stand to gain financially by
buying credit to satisfy their Kyoto commitments. This financial interest, rather th=
an
concern for global climate change, explains these negotiating positions.
The effective withdrawal of the USA from Kyoto
negotiations in March 2001 reduces, but does not eliminate, the potential
effectiveness of the Protocol.
Among other consequences is a substantially smaller demand for CDM
carbon credits than would otherwise be the case, and consequently a lower
expected price for carbon. On=
the
longer term, the current position of the USA should not be viewed as perman=
ent. The interdependence of all nations=
has
been suddenly made clear on both sides of the Atlantic by the terrorist att=
acks
against the USA in September 2001; one may hope that this increased awarene=
ss
may result in increasing willingness to address global problems in a unified
fashion.
Opposition of European countries to crediting
avoided deforestation is best explained by the fact that fossil fuel prices=
are
much higher in Europe than in the USA.&nbs=
p;
In virtually any European country a liter of gasoline costs at least
double the price in the USA (Sheehan, 2001, p. 48). This puts European industries at a
disadvantage in competition for international markets. European governments are therefore
anxious to force the USA to increase its energy prices. By closing the door to potentially=
large
sources of carbon credits available for purchase abroad, such as CDM projec=
ts
for avoiding tropical deforestation, the USA would be forced to apply carbon
taxes to fossil fuels. While =
there
is fairness in leveling the playing field for international competition, th=
is
is a separate issue from mitigating climate change.
Most Latin-American countries favor inclusion of
both plantations and avoided deforestation in the CDM. However, Brazil
currently opposes any credit for avoiding deforestation but favors credit f=
or
silvicultural plantations. Th=
is implies
a certain inconsistency in alleging lack of permanence as justification for
opposing avoided deforestation. The
Brazilian foreign ministry’s position on avoided deforestation is bet=
ter
explained by unstated fears of “internationalization” of the Am=
azon
(Fearnside, 2001a; Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force, 200=
1).
NGO positions
Four
major European-dominated NGOs (Greenpeace International, WWF-International,
Birdlife International and FOE-International) oppose inclusion of avoided d=
eforestation
in the CDM. The opposite posi=
tion
is held by major environmental NGOs headquartered in the USA, such as
Conservation International (CI), Environmental Defense (EDF), the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC).
Environmental
groups in the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America have varying
positions. The Regional Allia=
nce
for Conservation Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCA) issued a
statement in November 2000 supporting inclusion of avoided deforestation in=
the
CDM, signed by groups in 11 countries (ARCA, 2000). However, several other groups are
opposed to forests, the most voluble being the Friends of the Earth branch =
in
Paraguay.
In
Brazil almost all environmental groups favor forests (“Manifesta&cced=
il;ão...”,
2000), but a few do not (“A Brazilian NGO Declaration”, 2000).
Perhaps the situation was best summed up in a press interview by Mario Monz=
oni,
climate coordinator of FOE-Brazilian Amazonia: “It is very easy to be=
in
Washington or Amsterdam saying what nongovernmental organizations in the so=
uth
(developing world) should do. We
live here, this problem is here.” (Bugge, 2000). Among the organizations supporting
inclusion of avoided deforestation are the Brazilian Amazonia affiliate of =
FOE
(Monzoni et al., 2000), the Socioenvironmental Institute (ISA), Environment=
al
Research Institute of Amazonia (IPAM), Institute for Man and Environment in=
the
Amazon (IMAZON), and a wide array of grassroots groups such as the National
Council of Rubber Tappers (CNS), the Amazonian Working Group (GTA), the
Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), the Federation of Agricultural Workers of
Pará (FETAGRI), and the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Peoples of
Brazilian Amazonia (COIAB).
It
is difficult to understand how any environmental organization could take a
stand that implies throwing away one of the most important opportunities for
maintaining tropical forests. This
is particularly so for organizations like WWF and Birdlife International th=
at
have protection of biodiversity as their primary purpose, since without
tropical forests the World’s biodiversity would be much reduced. Even if achieved, the gain would be
modest from forcing the USA to meet its Kyoto emission quota almost exclusi=
vely
from reducing fossil fuel consumption (a highly uncertain payoff, given that
the USA Senate has not yet ratified the Protocol, independent of the recent
setback from President Bush). This
opportunity results from the unusual circumstance of the USA having signed =
the
Kyoto Protocol before decisions had been reached on matters such as inclusi=
on
of forests in the CDM. This
situation is very temporary. =
Any
gains would be on a “one-shot” basis because the “assigned
amounts” (the amount each Annex I country is allowed to emit without =
penalty)
will be renegotiated for each commitment period after the first one, so
countries like the USA will simply not agree to make emissions reductions as
large as they would have were forest mitigation measures included. While excluding forests would be a=
very
important loss for biodiversity, this would be in exchange for only a modest
(or even nonexistent) gain for climate.
Greenpeace and other groups opposing forests in the CDM base their argument on Article= 2 of the UN-FCCC, wh= ich specifies the criterion as “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”, and Article 12, Paragraph 5(c) of the Kyoto Protocol, which calls for “long-term bene= fits.” The words “stabilization” and “long-term” are interpreted to mean that we should only be concerned about the state of the atmosphere when equilibrium is reached centuries from now, and that what happens between now and then has no importance for humankind. Theoretically, the difference between the NGO positions in Europe and in Brazil could be explained if people in Brazil were interested in their children and grandchildren and Europeans were only interested in generations at least 200 years in the future. However,= the probability of a difference of this type is virtually zero, as people all o= ver the World appear to be basically same in their priorities for the future. <= o:p>
The
position of European NGOs can better be understood in terms of the unconsci=
ous
attraction of an opportunity to strike a blow at the USA. In Europe, the USA’s consump=
tion
lifestyle and associated cultural domination is resented on many counts, and
symbols such as McDonalds, Coca Cola and Walmart are generally reviled.
Attacking this vaguely defined complex of targets finds a ready following f=
or
reasons that have little to do with climate change. These include a desire =
to
punish the USA for its various sins in the world, the country’s role =
as
villain in climate negotiations among them. Although reducing consumption in th=
e USA
would have climate benefits, reducing this consumption should be viewed as a
means to an end rather than as an end in itself. Viewed in this way, it should not =
be
allowed to subvert global-warming mitigation efforts in other spheres, such=
as
tropical forest conservation. The environmental price would be high if we t=
hrow
away a major opportunity to maintain tropical rainforest in exchange for an
expected climate benefit several centuries in the future.
Acknowledgments
=
This
commentary is abbreviated and updated from a paper presented at the =
III Congresso Brasilei=
ro de
Sistemas Agroflorestais, 21-25 November 2000, Manaus, Amazonas (Fearnside,
2001b,c). I thank INPA PPI 1-=
3160
and CNPq AI 350230/97-8 for financial support. Three reviewers provided valuable
comments.
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Sheehan, M.O’M. =
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Make-or-break the Kyoto Protocol. Washington, DC, U.S.A.: World Wildlife
Fund-US (URL http://www.panda.org/=
climate).
Philip M. Fearnside
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; Department
of Ecology
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; National
Institute for Research
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; in the Amazon (INPA)
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp;
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
C.P.
478
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
69011-970
Manaus, Amazonas
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
BRAZIL
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
Fax:
+55-92-642-8909
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
Tel:
+55-92-643-1822
=
&nb=
sp; =
&nb=
sp; =
e-mail
pmfearn@inpa.gov.br
<= o:p>
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